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Trends in Communist Propaganda

16 Apr 75

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**Confidential**



# **TRENDS**

## **In Communist Propaganda**

### **HIGHLIGHTS:**

Initial Reaction to President's Foreign Policy Address - page 1

DRV, PRG Become Silent on Vietnam Negotiations Issue - page 8

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## U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

Only the Vietnamese communists have reacted with official statements to President Ford's 10 April foreign policy speech before a joint session of Congress. A spokesman for the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) and a DRV Foreign Ministry statement, on the 12th and 13th respectively, predictably assailed the President's requests for aid to South Vietnam and for authority from Congress to use troops if necessary to protect potential American and South Vietnamese evacuees. Both statements indicate that there is no obstacle to the immediate departure of Americans, and they maintain that there is no need for Vietnamese to leave the country. Although both the PRG and Hanoi warn that the President is contemplating increased U.S. intervention, they seem sanguine that communist victory in South Vietnam is inevitable.\*

Moscow's attention to the President's speech has included an extensive report of its content but only low-level followup comment. This publicity has focused on the Vietnamese issue, criticizing the U.S. "Administration's" policy but avoiding any personal abuse of the President. To date Moscow has ignored the President's reference to notes sent to the USSR and other participants in the international conference on Vietnam. On the more general aspects of the speech, Moscow has noted some of the critical references to the Soviet Union, without implying that these remarks carried any broader significance for detente generally. East European comment has balanced criticism of the President's request for military aid to Saigon with approval of "positive" features of the speech relating to U.S.-Soviet detente.

Peking reaction has been confined to two NCNA reports, one on the speech itself and the other noting reaction in the United States. While NCNA was critical of continued U.S. intervention in Vietnam, it cited press reports that U.S. officials were resigned to Saigon's collapse and to U.S. withdrawal from "overextended" positions in Asia. NCNA duly noted the President's remarks on Sino-U.S. relations, including his expressed hope that they would be enhanced during his planned visit later this year.

### PRG, HANOI RAP FORD REQUESTS FOR AID, EVACUATION AUTHORITY

The statement by a government spokesman of the PRG on 12 April and the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 13th castigated the President for attempting to "pressure" Congress for more aid for

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\* Vietnamese communist propaganda assessing the South Vietnam military situation is discussed in the Indochina section of this TRENDS.

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the Saigon regime and for authority to use troops to protect and evacuate Americans and the Vietnamese who have "cooperated" with them. Both statements imply that the Americans in South Vietnam are "military personnel in civilian guise." And, in the words of the PRG spokesman, those people who should have left long ago under the terms of the Paris agreement should now be withdrawn "immediately and completely." Declaring that withdrawal "certainly would not encounter any difficulties or obstacles," the spokesman recalled that the safe withdrawal of U.S. military forces in early 1973 had been "insured" by the PRG. Comment in Hanoi's army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN implicitly threatened that Americans might be in danger if they were not immediately withdrawn. Articles on the 12th and 15th said that Americans who helped the GVN "should be punished" but that their prompt withdrawal would be allowed.

The PRG spokesman's statement\* made no offer of laissez passer for Vietnamese personnel the United States might want to evacuate. Instead, it merely indicated that those Vietnamese who have "collaborated" with the United States would be treated under the provisions of the PRG's 25 March seven-point policy and 1 April 10-point policy, which set forth how various categories of people now living under the GVN would be dealt with under the PRG and how those already in the newly captured areas are to be handled. As evidence that treatment would be fair, the statement contended that those now living in the newly "liberated" areas are "happily and enthusiastically organizing a new life" and that this "completely refutes the myth about a 'bloodbath.'" The DRV Foreign Ministry statement of the 13th, making the same point, denied that there existed any intention to "mistreat strayed compatriots who sincerely repent" and added that the "sensational allegations and sophistries uttered by the Ford Administration . . . will surely deceive no one."

A 12 April NHAN DAN article under the authoritative "Commentator" byline spelled out in greater detail Hanoi's evaluation of the Administration's latest stand on Vietnam. Commentator saw Ford's request for Congress to approve the use of U.S. troops in an evacuation as an attempt to modify the August 1973 law limiting the President's authority to take military action in Indochina. He recalled that the Tonkin Gulf resolution had been passed by Congress at President Johnson's urging. Claiming that Johnson and Nixon both "used" the protection of Americans as a "pretext to expand the war," Commentator implied that Ford was acting similarly.

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\* The authoritative format of government spokesman's statement was most recently revived by the PRG on 30 March, for the first time since May 1974, to protest U.S. efforts to help in the Danang evacuation. For further background, see the TRENDS of 2 April 1975, pages 5-7.

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The overall tone of the Commentator article reflected confidence that Congress and the people of the United States would not assent to the President's requests. The United States, he said, has "changed," and as evidence of this contention, he pointedly observed that some of those "who once used national pride to deceive the American people have died or retired." According to Commentator, Americans are now too concerned about the "difficulties in their daily lives and in society" and as a result do not want to spend money for "continued involvement in Vietnam." Something of this same attitude, albeit less explicit, was contained in the PRG spokesman's statement, which expressed the opinion that the American people and Congress would "resolutely check" the White House's attempt to take "yet another dangerous step in its direct military involvement" in South Vietnam.

#### MOSCOW, EAST EUROPE FOCUS ON PRESIDENT'S VIETNAM REMARKS

Moscow's reaction to President Ford's 10 April address to Congress on the international situation has included an extensive report of the speech carried on Moscow domestic service on the 11th and a moderate volume of low-level comment. Both the report and comment have been highly tendentious on the Vietnam aspects of the President's speech, using such phrases as the "rotten Thieu regime" to discredit U.S. policy by association.

The detailed domestic radio account established the framework for subsequent critical comment on the President's remarks about Vietnam. The radio charged that the President's request for further military and economic aid for South Vietnam was contrary to the Paris peace agreement and "proof" of U.S. intentions to continue a policy of "interference in Vietnam's internal affairs." It dismissed as a "pretext" the President's explanation that the security of Americans and of South Vietnamese who have cooperated with the United States required congressional review of the law on Presidential powers to use U.S. forces overseas.

In keeping with Moscow's restrained treatment of President Ford, most commentaries on Vietnam in the wake of his speech criticized the policies of the "U.S. Administration" without referring to the President by name. For example, one of the harshest comments--an unattributed domestic service commentary on the 13th--did not mention Ford in arguing that the Administration's concern for the observation of the Paris agreement was "tantamount to hypocrisy" and "blasphemous," and that the United States was "not the least concerned" with observing the agreement. Considerable Moscow comment has focused on Western news reports citing strong U.S. public and congressional resistance to further military aid to the GVN and the use of U.S. military forces.

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On the broader aspects of the President's speech, Moscow has reported the President's remark that the United States has "no illusions" regarding the Soviet Union, that the United States and the Soviet Union are "rivals," that the President intends to visit Peking, and that the President regards the "huge" appropriations for defense as necessary for U.S. security. Moscow has also reported that the President expects a visit by Brezhnev this year, that he is optimistic about SALT, and that he is critical of the Congress on the trade bill.

The most substantial discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations in the light of the President's speech thus far has come in an international roundtable program on the 13th. Noting that a "campaign" against detente has been "set in motion recently by some organs of the press in the United States," the host Zorin asked guest Vitaliy Kobysh, IZVESTIYA correspondent in the United States, to comment. Kobysh put on a striking display of dialectical indecision, stressing on the one hand that one should not "harbor illusions" about the state of detente in the United States today, and on the other that the "broad mass of Americans" support detente. In elaborating on this positive note, which was the dominating theme of his comment, he stressed the role of American businessmen as supporters of detente, and also the basically affirmative role of the U.S. Administration.

EAST EUROPE Moscow's five orthodox East European allies have so far maintained a cautious stance on President Ford's 10 April speech, balancing criticism of the President's request for more aid to Saigon with approval of "positive" features of the speech relating to U.S.-Soviet detente. In addition to highlighting negative reaction by Senators Humphrey and McGovern to the President's Vietnam requests, the orthodox East Europeans have commented on their own that it is too late to save the Thieu regime, that the aid requests show that U.S. policy on Vietnam is basically unchanged, and that the use of U.S. troops to aid the evacuation of Americans from South Vietnam could lead to renewed combat involvement of U.S. military personnel. On this score, a typical comment by the East Berlin radio's Washington correspondent on the 14th noted in restrained terms that the President's request for authority to use U.S. troops during evacuation was highly "debatable," even for such a limited operation.

An 11 April Budapest radio commentary, asking rhetorically whether events would "drive the American Government toward another overt intervention" in Indochina, went on to predict that U.S. global policy would instead follow "the path of commonsense." The commentary typically cited in this connection the President's "positive" remarks on SALT, on Brezhnev's scheduled visit to the United States this year, and on the removal of obstacles to U.S.-Soviet trade.

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Less restrained comment was registered by the independently oriented East European countries. From Yugoslavia, Zagreb radio commentator Sundic declared on the 11th that the President's requests for aid to Saigon could lead to "renewal of American aggression" in Southeast Asia and predicted in effect that both the President and Secretary Kissinger would suffer irreparable political damage if Congress should reject the requests. Also on the 11th, Romania's Ceausescu declared at a Manila press conference, publicized by SCINTEIA the next day, that granting new aid to Saigon as requested by the President would constitute "interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam," contrary to the Paris agreements. The Albanian party daily ZERI : POPULLIT on the 12th predictably viewed the President's address as "reconfirming" the aggressive aims of U.S. imperialism in Indochina and elsewhere.

#### PEKING HITS U.S. VIETNAM STANCE, HAILS RESOLVE AGAINST USSR

President Ford's 10 April request for new Vietnam aid has triggered only low-keyed criticism from Peking in two NCNA reports on 13 April, one on the speech itself and the other noting reaction in the United States. The reports served to underscore Peking's thesis that the recent setback in U.S. Indochina policy has actually provided an opportunity for Washington to cut its losses there and concentrate on checking Soviet advances in the Middle East and Europe. NCNA confirmed Peking's desire to keep the Sino-U.S. rapprochement on course by citing the President's remarks on Sino-U.S. relations, including his prediction that they would be enhanced during his planned visit to Peking later this year.

The first NCNA report on the President's address balanced criticism of continued U.S. intervention in Vietnam against implicit Peking satisfaction conveyed in its detailing of the President's remarks suggesting limits on the U.S.-Soviet detente relationship. NCNA noted that the President's address showed that the United States "has no intention of discontinuing its interventionist policy towards South Vietnam" and that he was requesting emergency aid for the Saigon regime, "more than double" his earlier request, on the "pretext" that the United States "could not abandon our friends." NCNA then focused on the President's remarks on U.S.-Soviet relations, noting his characterization of current Moscow-Washington ties as "still a competitive relationship" as well as his declaration that "as long as I am President, we will not permit detente to become a license to fish in troubled waters."

Peking's initial criticism of the President's new Vietnam aid requests was softened somewhat by a second NCNA report, which played up U.S.

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press reports that U.S. officials were resigned to Saigon's collapse and now were moving to revitalize U.S. foreign policy by withdrawing from "overextended" positions in Asia and focusing on areas more vital to U.S. interests. Pointing up Peking's interest in seeing the United States strengthen its stand against the Soviet Union in Europe and the Middle East, the report claimed that U.S. journals have "stressed that the center of the U.S.-Soviet contention is in Europe and the Middle East, and that the United States should not foolishly and uselessly drain its energies in Southeast Asia."

Buttressing this position, NCNA cited Secretary Schlesinger's assessment in a March interview in the Philadelphia BULLETIN that Southeast Asia was of only "slight" importance in the international strategic balance, and it publicized the view expressed in the U.S. press that recent events in Vietnam and Cambodia have forced the United States to decide to concentrate on "what's really important, such as the Mideast and Europe." NCNA also called favorable attention to President Ford's reaffirmation of close ties with NATO allies and with Japan, noting the President's announcement of an upcoming summit meeting of the Atlantic alliance and replaying press reports claiming that the U.S. allies in NATO and Japan were pleased with the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina.

#### SPARSE PYONGYANG, HAVANA COMMENT ON PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

NORTH KOREA      The initial North Korean media reaction to the President's speech has been limited to a 13 April NODONG SINMUN commentary which, judging from a KCNA summary, virtually ignored the Indochina portion of the address. Without referring explicitly to the President's remarks, the paper observed that no amount of military aid could save the "U.S. imperialist puppets" from total collapse, and that the United States must "take its hands off" Vietnam and Cambodia and get out of Asia.

Focusing on U.S. security ties to Japan and the Republic of Korea, NODONG SINMUN pointed to the President's characterization of the U.S.-Japan security treaty as a "cornerstone of stability" in Asia. The commentary claimed that the United States would "further tighten the military compact with the Japanese militarist forces," especially in the event of war in Korea. Turning to the subject of U.S. security ties to South Korea, NODONG SINMUN reiterated Pyongyang's standard charge that the United States was attempting to keep South Korea as a stronghold in the midst of "their crumbling colonial system" and use it as a springboard for "a new war of aggression in Korea."

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CUBA. In the only available Cuban comment to date on the President's address, a Havana television commentary on the 12th, focusing on the Indochina aspects of the speech, claimed that it included "some of the usual arrogant threats of North American imperialism," and that President Ford "threatened and even talked about making decisions on his own" without consulting Congress on landing troops in South Vietnam. Claiming that the speech met with a cool reception, the commentary cited congressional criticism and concluded that the United States' Indochina policy "would continue to stumble" due to the Indochinese peoples' determination to achieve independence from "North American military occupation" and "imposed puppet regimes."

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## INDOCHINA

### DRV, PRG BECOME SILENT ON NEGOTIATIONS, HAIL MILITARY STRENGTH

Hanoi and PRG media are no longer promoting the possibility of a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam, and media comment on the military situation suggests that the Vietnamese communist leaders are confident of their ability to gain power militarily. The PRG's willingness to go to the negotiating table once its demands are met apparently was last voiced authoritatively in Front media in a 7 April transmission of an AFP interview with NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, dated the 1d. The last known Hanoi media mention of the possibility of talks was contained in a 21 March NHAN DAN editorial celebrating recent PLAF "victories" in the South.

The most obvious omission of any reference to negotiations in the current propaganda was in the 12 April government spokesman's statement by the PRG and in the DRV Foreign Ministry statement of the 13th that condemned President Ford's 10 April remarks on Vietnam.\* Probably as a reflection of the communists' recent battlefield successes, the latest statements and concurrent propaganda recalled the 21 March PRG statement without reaffirming its offer to negotiate with a Saigon government replacing Thieu. The propaganda continues to reiterate the demands in the March statement that the United States terminate its "intervention" in Vietnam and that Thieu be ousted.\*\*

**MILITARY SITUATION** The most comprehensive current evaluation of the military situation in South Vietnam was offered in a 13 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, which was permeated with a sense of impending doom for the Saigon administration and offered no options to the GVN except inevitable defeat. The unsigned commentary maintained that the Vietnamization strategy has "come to a turning point where no alternatives are possible," and it likened Thieu's present predicament to "a fish on the chopping board." Even in its discussion of a possible ouster of

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\* For a discussion of the statements and other PRG and Hanoi reaction to the President's address, see pages 1-3 of this issue of the TRENDS.

\*\* The 21 March PRG statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 26 March 1975, pages 6-10.

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the Thieu administration, the commentary held out no hope for bargaining but rather dismissed the eventuality beforehand, stating that "If Thieu is overthrown . . . then the collapse of the entire lackey apparatus would be almost certain."

Likewise, in its treatment of what action the United States might take to salvage the situation in Vietnam, the commentary was confident that Washington is at the end of its rope. Vietnamization has, the commentary said, come to a "deadend" and there are "no longer many alternatives for Ford to choose from now that the situation has completely changed." In conclusion, the commentary declared that events over the past month have "sounded the death knell of the 'Vietnamization' strategy," adding:

The current battle position can no longer be reversed. Following the U.S. withdrawal, it is now the turn of the puppets to collapse. This is the inevitable trend, and Ford's obduracy and blindness can at best prolong the process of this collapse.

#### PRG MEDIA CLAIM ORDER, SECURITY ESTABLISHED IN CAPTURED AREAS

Since the communists gained control of broad sections of South Vietnam, their media have been carrying numerous reports purporting to describe life in the newly "liberated" areas. While there may be little relationship between this material in the media and actual conditions in the captured territory, the propaganda does provide some insights into the communist program for establishing its administration in the South and into problems they face after assuming control of an area.

Vietnamese communist media depictions of life in the newly captured areas dwell upon evidence of a return to stability following "chaos" in the wake of the GVN withdrawal--citing the resumption of public services, medical treatment, commerce, education, transportation, and other manifestations of normal life. At the same time there are media reports on the creation of special security units to guard property and maintain public order, suggesting that communist authorities are still fearful of possible looting and other acts of violence. Several recently captured cities are now reported to have "people's revolutionary committees" and new mass organizations, and top-level PRG and NFLSV

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officials have reportedly visited some of the newly acquired provincial capitals. The media have also noted the continuity of GVN civil servants in their positions, in keeping with the PRG's stated policy of allowing public officials to continue to work. In at least one instance, Liberation Radio has reported that North Vietnamese agricultural experts are being sent South along with aid shipments to the new territory.

**SECURITY** A 9 April Liberation Radio commentary on "protecting the lives and property . . . in the newly liberated areas" charged that the "Thieu clique" had transformed the cities into "lawless areas" and that a "chaotic" situation prevailed in areas from which its forces had fled. In describing the process for restoring order in the cities, the commentary typically claimed that "workers, youths, and students have become a core force for maintaining order and security in their areas" and that "scores of self-defense and order-maintaining units have been formed." In attesting to the efficiency of these new units, the commentary boasted that many who had initially fled from their homes have returned to find their valuables intact.

Potential problems in maintaining discipline among communist military forces occupying GVN areas were implicitly acknowledged in an article in the April issue of the North Vietnamese army monthly journal TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, broadcast by Hanoi on 13 April. The article, under the byline Nguyen Hai, discussed the dangers of GVN psychological warfare efforts, warning against the remnants of the "debauched culture of U.S. neocolonialism" and noting that occupying troops must strictly refrain from "looking at the enemy's paintings and pictures, from reading his publications, or listening to his radio stations."

**ADMINISTRATION OF "LIBERATED AREAS"** The importance of quickly establishing a new administration in the captured areas has been stressed in official PRG statements, such as its 4 April 10-point statement of policy toward "newly liberated areas." Reflecting this objective, the propaganda has promptly taken note of the existence of "revolutionary committees" or "administrations" in several areas, including Darlac Province and the cities of Phuoc Binh, Hue, Danang, Quang Nghia, and Nha Trang. In scattered instances the committee members have been named by the media, but ordinarily no background information has been supplied. (An exception to this was a Danang revolutionary committee member, Pham Duc Nam, who was also identified as a representative of the NFLSV in Quang Da Province, a position the media had attributed to him as long ago as 1968.) The process by which the committees

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have been formed has generally not been publicly discussed, although a Hanoi broadcast on the 13th noted the "election" of a district committee chairman in Thua Thien Province.

The 1 April 10-point policy statement had called for the "complete eradication" of the GVN "ruling apparatus," but it indicated that government agencies would continue to function under communist "management" and that public officials would continue in their duties. Reports on the establishment of "revolutionary" administrations have contained scattered references to "public employees" being admitted to the new administrative organs and cited the continuation of teachers in their positions. A 10 April Liberation Radio report on DRV emulation efforts in support of the South included an unusual reference to the dispatch to South Vietnam of North Vietnamese agricultural experts to care for shipments of animals to the newly captured territories.

#### PEKING BACKS PRG, DRV PROTESTS ON U.S. EVACUATION EFFORTS

Prior to Peking's initial reportorial acknowledgment of President Ford's 10 April foreign policy address,\* a 13 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article earlier the same day had offered "firm support" for Vietnamese communist protests of 7 and 8 April against U.S. evacuation efforts. While a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 8th received routine, summarized treatment by NCNA, the PRG statement of the 7th was played twice by NCNA, an unusual duplication with no apparent explanation involving summarized reporting on the 8th and a textual report on the 11th. The PRG's most recent previous government statements, on 21 March 1975 and 8 October 1974, both prompted PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles; one was summarized by NCNA and the other carried in full. The seconding of Vietnamese official statements with a Commentator article--Peking's lowest level of authoritative comment--is consistent with Chinese practice since the 1973 Paris agreement of endorsing such statements at a lower level.

The 13 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article echoed Vietnamese communist complaints about U.S. involvement in Vietnamese evacuation efforts and the dispatch of U.S. ships to the area. Commentator

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\* Peking's reaction, in NCNA reports of 13 April, is discussed in the U.S. Foreign Policy section of this TRENDS, pages 5-6.

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did not voice the usual call for the United States and Saigon to follow the lead of the DRV and PRG in strictly implementing the Paris agreement. Instead the article indicated that the "correct way" to settle the South Vietnam question "now" was a total end to U.S. involvement so that the Vietnamese could settle their own affairs--a formulation which could encompass a military solution.

The article implicitly called upon the United States to "learn from historic lessons" and to recognize that the dispatch of warships and increases in aid to the GVN "can by no means hold up the pace of the triumphant advance of the South Vietnamese people." Perhaps because Peking sees its allies' victory in South Vietnam as imminent as well as inevitable, the usual pledge of Chinese support for the Vietnamese struggle was not reiterated by Commentator.

#### KOSYGIN BLAMES SAIGON FOR FIGHTING, SILENT ON U.S. ROLE

Moscow's most authoritative comment to date on recent developments in Indochina came in a speech by Premier Kosygin at a 9 April dinner for visiting Yugoslav Premier Bijedic, and later in the 15 April Soviet-Yugoslav communique. Kosygin's brief discussion of Vietnam focused entire responsibility for the continued fighting on the Saigon government, making no reference to the U.S. role supporting the GVN. He condemned Saigon for "grossly violating" the Paris agreement and echoed the Vietnamese communist position that Thieu had forcibly evicted South Vietnamese "refugees" from their homes. Kosygin's denunciation of Saigon was reiterated in the joint Soviet-Yugoslav communique, in which both sides urged the complete implementation of a "political settlement" in Vietnam.

#### "TOTAL DEFEAT" OF U.S. CAMBODIAN POLICY HAILED BY RGNU, ALLIES

The Cambodian insurgent Front (NUFC) and its allies have called the U.S. evacuation from Phnom Penh a demonstration of the "total defeat" of U.S. policy in Cambodia.

Khieu Samphan, RGNU deputy prime minister and Front military chief, stressed the futility of further resistance by Phnom Penh following the U.S. evacuation and denounced the newly organized Supreme Committee in Phnom Penh in a 13 April appeal broadcast by the Voice of NUFC of Phnom Penh. He cited the

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evacuation from Phnom Penh of U.S. personnel and of GKR acting president Sautham Khoy as "proof of the total defeat of the U.S. imperialist war of aggression" in Cambodia and as evidence of the "complete collapse" of the Phnom Penh government, noting that there is now "no state, no law, nor any other institutions."

Khieu Samphan denounced the Supreme Committee in Phnom Penh, saying it represented no one "but a few traitors" and was "designed obstinately to begin another round of barbarism" in perpetuating the war. He noted that with the loss of all supply routes, including supply by air into Pochentong airport, the populace of Phnom Penh has as its only alternative to "destruction" the Front's standing offer of pardon and participation in the NUFC.

PEKING, HANOI, Peking noted in an NCNA report on 13 April.  
MOSCOW RESPONSE that the U.S. evacuation from Phnom Penh demonstrated "the defeat of the U.S. policy of aggression and intervention" in Cambodia. Hanoi, in a 14 April NHAN DAN editorial, also assessed the U.S. evacuation as symbolizing the "total defeat of the U.S. imperialists in their five years of aggression, intervention, and military involvement." Calling the "all-round failure" of the U.S. in Cambodia a "heavy setback," NHAN DAN warned that the United States was now in an "unprecedentedly weak position" and would meet new defeats if it adhered to its present Indochina policies. Moscow reported the U.S. evacuation in a TASS dispatch of 12 April.

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## MIDDLE EAST

### USSR-IRAQ STRAINS REFLECTED IN SADDAM HUSAYN TALKS IN MOSCOW

In the latest of his annual visits to the Soviet Union, Iraq's Saddam Husayn, deputy secretary general of the Ba'th Party Regional Command and deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council, led a delegation to Moscow 14-15 April.\* The visit coincided with publicity marking the anniversary of the 9 April 1972 signing in Baghdad of the 15-year Soviet-Iraqi friendship and cooperation treaty. Moscow comment on the visit has ceaselessly praised the treaty and placed much emphasis on the theme of mutually beneficial bilateral relations. In the communique the sides expressed their "profound satisfaction" with their "friendly and cooperative" relations and stated their intent to study expansion of their economic and trade cooperation. Two agreements were signed during the visit--a consular agreement and one on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

As in past visits, however, the speeches and the communique reflected continuing differences on various issues, particularly--as Iraqi sources in the past have been frank to admit--on the question of terms and method of approach toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement.

GENEVA CONFERENCE      Given Iraqi reluctance, no mention was made in the communique of the need for resumption of the Geneva conference. In his 14 April banquet speech, Kosygin repeated the call for "speediest" resumption of the Geneva conference--in contrast to some recent Soviet comment which has suggested that the conference should be carefully prepared. Kosygin went on to express the view that the conference would offer the advantage that all questions relating to a Mideast settlement would be discussed "not in camera but openly, before Arab and world opinion." (In the only known Soviet discussion of possible Geneva procedures, an INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article last September

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\* With the exception of 1971, when no visit was announced, Saddam Husayn has visited Moscow annually since 1970. His most recent visits were discussed in the TRENDS of 27 February 1974, pages 6-7; 28 March 1973, pages 16-20; and 24 February 1972, pages 34-37.

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had suggested "varied forms of talks and contacts such as plenary sessions, committees, working groups," and meetings and contacts "of other sorts.")

Kosygin obliquely attacked the U.S.-sponsored step-by-step approach in criticizing Israel and "imperialist forces supporting it" for attempting to persuade the Arab countries "to make such concessions as would in fact legalize" Israeli occupation of Arab territories. And he denounced Israel for trying to exchange "insignificant troop withdrawals" for "major political concessions," an approach which he said would not lead to peace.

As for the Iraqi view, Saddam Husayn had said, in an interview with the Cairo weekly ROSE AL-YUSUF published on the 14th, that the Geneva conference should be the "last stage" of a peaceful solution. "It is in our national and patriotic interest that we only go there after we have reached the peak of armament," he added. Since his remarks were made for an Egyptian audience, it is possible that he had in mind Egyptian President as-Sadat's recent complaints that the Soviet Union is fulfilling Syria's arms requirements but has sent no "replacement" arms to Egypt.\*

PALESTINIAN ISSUE      The communique went a step further on the Palestinian goal than past Soviet-Iraqi communiques, which called for insuring the Palestinians' "legitimate rights" (in 1973) and their "national rights" (in 1974). The present language--"guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination"--would appear to represent a compromise on the two sides' positions.\*\* Kosygin in his banquet speech spelled out the

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\* Former Egyptian Prime Minister Hijazi was asked in a British television interview, reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 21 February, about a statement by Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi that Egypt would not go to Geneva unless it had replaced the arms lost in the October war. Hijazi responded indirectly that "this does not mean that we refuse to go to Geneva; however, we mean that Israel has acquired all of the arms it lost." He said Egypt was not setting conditions for returning to Geneva.

\*\* Iraq and Yugoslavia employed a different formula in the October 1974 communique on Yugoslav Premier Bijedic's visit to Iraq: Peace in the Middle East, it said, could not be attained without securing the "full national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, which presupposes the recognition of their right to their own land."

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Palestinians' "right to create their own state," as Gromyko had done in his 2 February speech in Damascus. But Moscow did not report Iraq's support for the extremist view of the right to the whole of Palestine, as expressed by Saddam Husayn in his reply speech to Kosygin. According to Baghdad radio's account of the speech--but not the short summary by TASS--he said that "the important thing in the whole matter is the Palestinian people's established right to their country and to self-determination on their land--Palestine."

ARAB UNITY While Kosygin repeated Moscow's long-standing counsel to the Arabs to strengthen their "anti-imperialist" unity, his remarks carried an added edge of impatience when he admonished Iraq, Syria and Egypt to "quickly surmount all that still impedes the unification of their efforts."\* He did not spell out any differences, but the Beirut AN-NAHAR on the 7th had pointed to a chief problem on Saddam Husayn's agenda, that of Baghdad's grievances with Syria over Euphrates River waters. Baghdad in the past few weeks has been pressing its claims vigorously, contending that it is being deprived of water because of Damascus' Euphrates dam--which is being constructed with Soviet assistance. According to AN-NAHAR, Baghdad thought Moscow should have realized the dam's effect on Iraq and should have reached agreement with the Syrians on the quantity of water to be stored annually so that Iraq would not be harmed. AN-NAHAR added that Baghdad wanted to give Moscow a choice: "Either an understanding takes place with Damascus to solve the problem amicably," or "relations will completely deteriorate."

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\* Former AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal vividly revealed the depth of Soviet frustrations over persistent inter-Arab differences in an article in January 1970 when he wrote that Kosygin had said in exasperation to the then Iraqi deputy premier: "You confuse us, Arab friends. We beg you for your own sake and for the sake of your friends to agree on one thing. Agree on the maximum or on the minimum; it does not matter, but agree. For heaven's sake, agree on something."

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KURDISH PROBLEM,  
IRAQ-IRAN ACCORD

Moscow's correct but unenthusiastic attitude toward the Iraqi-Iranian agreement signed in Algiers on 6 March was reflected in the handling of Saddam Husayn's visit. Kosygin in his banquet speech, remarking that the Kurdish problem "is being solved," managed to ignore entirely the Iranian-Iraqi accord which in effect ended Iranian support of the Kurds. Instead, he appeared to offer the benefits of the USSR's "nationalities" experience in a passage perhaps designed to caution the Iraqis against acting with undue severity against the Kurds.\*

In an ambiguous transition passage leading to a discussion of the Arab-Israeli question, Kosygin said the Iraqis knew from experience that the "external situation" might favorably affect internal efforts for social and economic reforms and in other cases might create serious obstacles to domestic construction. He went on to warn against attempts by "imperialist forces and reaction" to divert Iraq and other "progressive" Arab states from their chosen road. Kosygin may have had several objects in mind, such as the difficulties engendered by Iran's support for the Kurdish struggle against the Ba'thist regime, or even Iraqi interest in economic interchange with the West.

Saddam Husayn, for his part, in banquet remarks not reported by TASS, pointed to the "complete liquidation of the conspiratorial and sabotaging activities of the agent enclave" just a year after the proclamation of autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq. He went on to speak of the "sincere efforts" and "quick and earnest steps" being taken to establish normal relations with Iran and to implement all provisions of the agreement through "common efforts and cooperation of both sides."

Moscow made a token gesture of approbation in the communique, in which the Soviet Union "expressed its satisfaction" with the recent Iraqi-Iranian agreement "for the settlement of the problems between them."

\* Kosygin's approving remarks on Ba'th Party and Iraqi Communist Party cooperation in the Progressive National Front also seemed contrived as a hint that Moscow does not want to see a recurrence of Ba'thist hostility toward the communists now that the Kurdish issue no longer requires the cooperation of the "progressive forces." Kosygin said that "we regard the further cohesion" of all forces devoted to national and social liberation as a pledge of "preservation and augmentation of the revolutionary gains" of the Iraqi people.

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## CPSU SLOGANS

## MAY DAY SLOGANS PROJECT CONTINUITY ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

A slight toning down of the militancy in the CPSU Central Committee's May Day slogans addressed to such classic "revolutionary" situations as Vietnam, Portugal and Chile is the principal change evident in the foreign policy section of this year's version, publicized in Moscow on 13 April. Far from suggesting any change in the Soviet Union's overall policy stance, however, they seem intended simply to register the fact that progress has been achieved toward reaching the goals of the revolutionary movements in some of these areas. The slogans calling for making detente "irreversible" and for the triumph of the ideas of the "peace program" remain unchanged.

+ The slogan hailing the Vietnamese people drops the clause claiming that they had "won a historic victory over the forces of imperialist aggression," apparently to avoid any suggestion that the events currently taking place in Vietnam are anticlimactic. The clause claiming victory had been introduced in May 1973 and had been repeated in all subsequent May Day and October Revolution slogans.

+ The slogan hailing the people of Chile refers to their "courageous struggle against reactionary fascist forces," but drops the assertion, included in the May and October 1974 slogans, that they are also fighting against a "campaign of terror."

+ The status of the Portuguese revolution is made to appear more secure by toning down the ringing call to "strengthen solidarity with the Portuguese people" to the more sedate salutation: "Warm greetings to . . . ."

In contrast to the subtlety of the changes in these foreign policy slogans, changes affecting the internal policy section are straightforward and clearly related to topical considerations. There are two new slogans on World War II, which correspond to the current campaign to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the victory; neither of them mentions the role of the Western allies in the war. Another new slogan calls for redoubled efforts to implement the CPSU's "agrarian policy"--a possible sign of lobbying by agricultural interests at a time when priorities for the next five-year plan are under consideration. Finally, a new slogan on elections has been added because of the current elections to republican supreme soviets.

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## U S S R

### SHELEPIN OUSTED FROM POLITBURO AFTER STORMY VISIT TO BRITAIN

A 16 April CPSU Central Committee plenum has announced the removal from the Politburo of Brezhnev's onetime rival, 57-year-old trade union council chairman Aleksandr Shelepin, reportedly "at his own request." His removal comes on the heels of his disastrous early April visit to Britain, which was probably used as a pretext for his ouster. The announcement on the plenum indicated that it concentrated on foreign affairs, providing the opportunity to criticize Shelepin for making or mishandling the controversial trip.

Greeted by thousands of rock-and-bottle throwing demonstrators upon his arrival in London on 31 March, his four-day visit had to be cut to three days of furtive travel. At the end of the visit, in the relative safety of Scotland, Shelepin lashed back at "Zionists" for organizing the demonstrations.

His exploits were extensively described in the trade union organ TRUD but, as usual, received scant attention in PRAVDA. Based on the 2 April TRUD account, Shelepin attempted to represent the visit as a success, expressing his "full satisfaction" with the results of his talks with British trade union leaders and describing the visit as "historic" and a "basic turning point" in relations between British and Soviet trade unions. At a press conference in Scotland he criticized the "loud fuss" made about his visit in the British press, and accused "Zionists" and "reactionaries" of organizing demonstrations to disrupt detente. Almost as if expecting trouble upon his return, he gratuitously declared that "in our party and in the Politburo there exists full unity of views on absolutely all questions of internal and foreign policy," adding obsequiously that the work of "the outstanding figure of our great Leninist party and the international communist and workers movement, Leonid Ilich Brezhnev personally," was unanimously and warmly supported by the Soviet people, the party, and the trade unions.

Servile flattery of Brezhnev has been a trademark of Shelepin in recent years as he has apparently tried to hang onto his position in the leadership, badly undermined after an earlier challenge to Brezhnev in the mid-1960's. In March 1972 Shelepin began referring to the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev, becoming the second Politburo member (after Brezhnev's close protege, D.A. Kunayev) to pay Brezhnev this honor. In a January 1973 speech he went beyond other Politburo

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members in giving Brezhnev personal credit for foreign policy successes. Shelepin's strategy apparently spared him the fate of Brezhnev foes Shelost and Voronov, who were ousted from the Politburo in April 1973. He was still pursuing the same course as late as 8 April 1975, when he called Brezhnev "head" of the Politburo. There have been no recent media indications that Shelepin's position was threatened, or that the activities of his trade union organization have been under criticism.

#### SOCIAL SCIENCES INNOVATION ANNOUNCED BY ACADEMY OF SCIENCES LEADER

USSR Academy of Sciences Vice President P.N. Fedoseyev, head of the academy's social sciences section, has announced a new emphasis for social sciences that will combine disciplines to harness joint efforts by social scientists in solving Soviet socioeconomic problems more effectively. A concrete manifestation of this approach was the creation of a new Leningrad socioeconomic research institute bringing together sociologists, economists and philosophers to assist Leningrad leaders in applying the new Leningrad complex socioeconomic development plan, the first such plan in the USSR. The forms employed up to now in this "complex" approach in social sciences have included joint councils and groups participating in work on the new five-year plan and long-range plans.

The new direction was announced by Fedoseyev at a late 1974 conference of academy vice presidents and leaders of the humanities sections and divisions of the USSR and republic academies, but only reported for the first time in the March 1975 issue of the HERALD OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. Fedoseyev stressed that problems of development of Soviet society cannot be resolved without economists, sociologists, philosophers, historians, psychologists and legal scholars working together in a complex approach, as they had done in working on the Complex Program for Scientific-Technical Progress in the USSR and its Social Consequences for 1976-90. This successful cooperation must be continued, Fedoseyev said, adding that the "main direction of scientific-organizational activity in the field of social sciences is becoming the creation of complex scientific collectives, the searching for new forms of creative inter-institute contacts, the formation of joint scientific councils and groups, etc." "Extremely typical" of this trend, said Fedoseyev, was the recent decision to unite Leningrad sociologists, economists, philosophers and historians of science and technology into a complex Leningrad Institute for Socieconomic Problems.

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The creation of the Institute for Socioeconomic Problems was revealed in a 17 January 1975 LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA interview with its newly appointed director, G.N. Cherkasov. He defined the institute's tasks as studying the administration of scientific-technical progress, the theory and methods of socioeconomic planning, and the effect of scientific-technical progress on labor and the way of life, as well as propagating experiences in socialist competitions and undertaking studies for local party and soviet organs. LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA on 31 January reported a Leningrad conference attended by Fedoseyev and Leningrad party leaders to organize the new institute and indicated that the institute would be formed from the Leningrad branches of the institutes of philosophy, sociological research, and economics, the Central Mathematical Economics Institute, the Institute of History of Natural Science and Technology, and the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Problems of Organization and Administration of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology. The announcement on the formation of the institute in the February HERALD OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES specified that it would be under the Academy of Sciences' economics division, but that the academy's division for philosophy and law would have jurisdiction over the institute's research in that division's fields.

In a March 1975 KOMMUNIST article, Leningrad party First Secretary Romanov stated that the institute had been created to concentrate efforts of Leningrad social scientists on tasks of complex socioeconomic planning in his oblast. Leningrad has pioneered in this field and, with encouragement from Brezhnev, has recently completed and submitted to higher authorities a basic draft of a complex plan for socioeconomic development of Leningrad covering 1976-80. The Leningrad State University has long had a Scientific Research Institute for Complex Social Research, which according to Romanov's March article has been responsible for coordinating the work on local complex socioeconomic plans.

Although this appears to be the first such new institute created, as Fedoseyev indicated, joint councils and other forms of coordination have been used in the past. For example, in August 1973 the Academy of Sciences Presidium created a Scientific Council for Economic, Political and Ideological Problems of the USA under its social sciences section. This council was put in charge of Americanology, coordinating the work of economists, historians, philosophers, sociologists and journalists throughout the Soviet Union. USA Institute director G.A. Arbatov was named head of the council.

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## AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS EXCEEDING FIVE-YEAR PLAN GOALS

The Soviet agricultural sector, accustomed to seeing its investments continually siphoned off for other, higher-priority sectors during past five-year plans, is not only retaining all its funds in the current five-year plan but is receiving even more resources than planned. The 1971-75 five-year plan investments in agriculture have risen from an originally announced preliminary goal of 120.6 billion rubles in 1970 to the official 128.6 billion goal in 1971 and now to a recently announced new figure of 131.8 billion.

Agriculture's success at holding and even expanding its share of Soviet resources reflects Brezhnev's unremitting support and also the strenuous efforts by State Planning Commission (Gosplan) First Deputy Chairman T.I. Sokolov to protect agricultural interests in the planning bureaucracy.

**RISE ANNOUNCED** The new priority for agriculture was dramatically underscored by the recent revelation that 2.8 billion rubles more than planned have already been invested in agriculture during the current five-year plan; Sokolov himself was first to announce this and the new total five-year plan figure. In a March 1975 *ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE* article, Sokolov declared that the state and kolkhozes would invest 131.8 billion rubles in agriculture (including both production and non-production projects) for the 1971-75 period, and he bragged that during the first four years of the present five-year plan, the original investment goal for agriculture had been overfulfilled by 2.8 billion rubles. Sokolov repeated the 131.8 billion figure in a March *QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS* article, but so far he remains the only Soviet official to cite this figure rather than the official goal.

The original 1971-75 goal for agricultural investment was announced by Brezhnev at the July 1970 Central Committee plenum: 120.6 billion rubles, including 77.6 billion of state funds and 43 billion from kolkhozes. This in itself was an upward revision of Gosplan's draft plan presented to the Politburo in May 1970 and overridden by Brezhnev, Polyanskiy and their allies. When the five-year plan was finally worked out in 1971, agriculture's share had risen to 128.6 billion rubles, including 82.2 billion of state funds and over 46 billion from kolkhozes. Moreover, starting in mid-1972, agricultural spokesmen began referring to 83.1 billion of state funds, instead of 82.2 billion. They continued to refer to 128.6 (or, in most cases, about 129) billion rubles as the combined goal and cited a reduced kolkhoz share of 45.5 billion.

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However, in late 1973 it was revealed that in the first three years of the plan (1971-73), 72 billion rubles of state and kolkhoz funds had been actually invested--2.5 billion more than planned. These figures were first announced at the December 1973 Supreme Soviet session by Gosplan Chairman Baybakov, who declared that the following year's agricultural investments would stick to the originally planned 28 billion for 1974 (18.4 billion of state and 9.5 billion of kolkhoz funds). A series of subsequent articles indicated that the five-year plan goal of 128.6 (or 129) billion rubles was still the official figure. Articles confirming that figure included one by Gosplan department chief G. Gaponenko in the February 1974 PLANNED ECONOMY, by Lenin Agricultural Academy Vice President V. Pannikov in the 11 April 1974 RED STAR, by economist N. Lagutin in the 3 August 1974 IZVESTIYA, and by Central Committee Agriculture Secretary F. Kulakov in the 22 September 1974 RURAL LIFE.

Nevertheless, agricultural investments continued to inch upward during 1974. Thus, above-plan investments rose from 2.5 billion at the end of 1973 to 2.8 billion at the end of 1974. Possibly reflecting sensitivity over the situation, Baybakov in his plan report at the December 1974 Supreme Soviet session did not cite precise five-year plan and annual plan figures for agriculture, as he had done the previous two years, but did note generally that agricultural investments were running ahead of the plan.

Although Baybakov remained reticent, a higher five-year plan figure was hinted at when First Deputy Minister of Agriculture L.I. Khitrin declared in the 18 February 1975 PRAVDA that over 100 billion rubles had already been invested in agriculture during the first four years of the five-year plan (1971-74), and when Gosplan Deputy Chairman for Agriculture N.P. Gusev revealed in the 3 January 1975 RURAL LIFE that 31 billion more would be invested during 1975 (20.8 billion from the state and 10 billion from kolkhozes).

Although much of the rise comes from kolkhoz funds, it appears that almost half comes from an increase in state investments. In December 1972 Baybakov stated that 28 billion of state funds had been invested in 1971-72 and 16.4 billion would be invested in 1973. The following year he announced a 1974 plan of 18.4 billion and, according to Gusev, 20.8 billion will be invested in 1975. This totals 83.6 billion, up 1.4 billion from the 1971 official goal of 82.2 billion, or almost half of the 3.2 billion rise from 128.6 to 131.8 billion.

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A substantial part of the 1.4 billion rise in state investments apparently is in non-production rural projects (housing, kindergartens, clubs and other facilities), as against the production category. Non-production expenditures have traditionally enjoyed less support than those which result in increased production. In a July 1971 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article, P. Poletayev stated that 70.7 billion of the planned 82.2 billion of state funds would go for production--i.e., leaving 11.5 billion for non-production projects. A 15 June 1972 IZVESTIYA editorial cited 71 billion for production projects out of 83.1 billion in state investments--i.e. leaving 12.1 billion for the non-production category. Sokolov, in a February 1973 PLANNED ECONOMY article, declared that 15 percent of the 83.1 billion would go to housing and cultural projects--i.e., about 12.5 billion. Though these figures are somewhat imprecise, they do suggest an increase of as much as one billion over original plans for state investments in non-production projects.

REVERSAL OF GOSPLAN BIAS      The current overfulfillment of agricultural investments is in sharp contrast to previous five-year plans, when planners customarily diverted agricultural funds to heavy industry and defense. As present Procurements Minister G.S. Zolotukhin complained at the March 1965 CPSU Central Committee plenum, no one in the planning organs has "ever really defended the interests of agriculture," and planners "year in year out have cut the financial and material-technical aid and have striven to pump as much money as possible out of agriculture." Even after the March 1965 plenum had reallocated investments in favor of agriculture, Brezhnev wound up complaining at the September 1965 Central Committee plenum of continuing attempts in Gosplan to "'balance' the figures at the expense of agriculture . . . in spite of the perfectly clear decisions of the March 1965 Central Committee plenum . . . ." At the October 1968 Central Committee plenum Brezhnev revealed that for the first three years of the 1966-70 plan, instead of the planned 21.2 billion of state investments in agriculture, only 17.3 billion had been invested, "almost 4 billion rubles less." He complained that investments in fertilizer and tractor production had been reduced, explained that "often planning organs, encountering difficulties in finding capital investments, seek to overcome them with funds designated for agriculture," and asserted that "there are also cases where material-technical resources allotted to agriculture are transferred to other purposes."

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Thus, when Brezhnev pushed through a big new boost in agricultural investments in the spring of 1970, he moved to protect this increase by placing longtime agricultural lobbyist T.I. Sokolov in Gosplan as first deputy chairman. Sokolov immediately wrote an article in the September 1970 issue of Gosplan's organ PLANNED ECONOMY, warning that "attempts to resolve particular economic problems at the expense of agricultural development must be decisively suppressed."

Sokolov quickly took two important initiatives. He assigned quotas to ministries starting in January 1971 to force them to fulfill deliveries of machinery, parts and fertilizer to agriculture. Also starting in January 1971, he moved to protect investments in non-production agricultural projects by tying these to planning of agricultural production projects. Previously, construction of rural housing, kindergartens, clubs and other such facilities was scattered among such low-priority planning categories as education and culture, housing, and public services.

Sokolov clearly worked hard to change Gosplan's anti-agriculture bias and to block any nibbling away of agricultural allocations. Moreover, in a February 1971 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE article, Sokolov declared that the task was not just to utilize all the funds allocated to agriculture, "but also to seek out additional sources for overfulfilling the capital construction plan." The recent overfulfillment in investment is testimony to Sokolov's success, and in his March 1975 article he declared that the 2.8-billion-ruble overfulfillment of investments represented an important change in Gosplan's attitude toward agriculture.

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## SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

## PEKING TEMPERS CRITICISM OF INDIAN "EXPANSION" IN SIKKIM

There is evidence of some moderation in Peking's customary harsh denunciations of India's moves in regard to the strategic border state of Sikkim in an authoritative 13 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article that omits some of the harsher, more sweeping charges leveled against India in the summer of 1974, also in a Sikkim context. The omissions may reflect a subtle Peking effort to continue recent steps to move Sino-Indian relations off dead center.\* Commentator labeled as "naked aggression" India's role in the decision last week by Sikkim's pro-Indian National Assembly to seek status as a constituent state of India, as well as the concurrent forcible disarming by Indian armed forces in Sikkim of the Chogyal's palace guard.

Commentator characterized India's policy toward Sikkim as one of "annexation by armed force," explaining that the Sikkim National Assembly had made its decision about union with India "at the point of bayonet," and predicted that the Sikkim people would not tolerate India's action and would continue waging "indomitable struggle." Commentator attacked Mrs. Gandhi and her father Jawaharlal Nehru by name for their longstanding expansionist "ambition," linked New Delhi's current action with its armed "dismemberment" of Pakistan in 1971 and its "annexation" of Indian-occupied Kashmir in February 1975, and charged the Soviet Union with encouraging Indian expansionism.

Despite these reiterations of Peking's longstanding opposition to what it regards as Indian expansionism, Commentator failed to repeat a number of sensitive charges made in authoritative Chinese comment last summer against New Delhi's attempts to solidify control over Sikkim by making it an "associate state" of the Indian union. It did not repeat

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\* Peking's sending of a friendship delegation to New Delhi in February 1975, the first such delegation in over a decade, as well as other recent Chinese gestures toward New Delhi are discussed in the TRENDS of 12 March 1975, pages 20-21. For background on Chinese criticism last summer, see the TRENDS of 11 September 1974, pages 10-11.

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last number's charge that New Delhi "dreams" of hegemony over South Asia, nor did it claim that India desires to use its atomic power to engage in "nuclear blackmail" and to be recognized as a "sub-superpower." Peking also evaded past charges that New Delhi's actions were a cause of unrest in South Asia, and it failed to reaffirm explicit Chinese support for Sikkimese resistance against New Delhi.

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## NOTES

EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS: Reports on the second session of the European communist party conference editorial commission working group on 8-10 April reflect continuing differences between orthodox and independently oriented parties over plans for the projected European CP conference. According to TASS, the East Berlin working group session "continued in a democratic spirit to conduct a broad exchange of views on the preparation of the draft final document" of the conference--language virtually identical to that of TASS's report on the first working group session on 17-19 February, and thus reflecting little progress toward agreement. Moscow's concern to exercise control over the preparatory work, despite professed observance of democratic procedures, was reflected in the attendance this time of representatives from the Irish, Danish, Finnish, and Austrian CP's in addition to the 16 parties which attended the February session. This increased the majority of pro-Moscow parties over the seven mavericks in attendance, which included the Romanian, Yugoslav, and Italian parties.

PRC-TAIWAN: Peking's first monitored propaganda effort to exploit the impact of Chiang Kai-shek's death on the Nationalist government and encourage Taiwan officials to return to the mainland came in a 12 April signed article broadcast by Peking's "Fukien Front" radio beamed to Taiwan. The article carefully juxtaposed allegations of "panicky" feelings among Taiwan officials after Chiang's demise with praise for the "lenient" PRC policy of "letting bygones be bygones," as demonstrated in Peking's recent decision to release nearly 300 former Nationalist "war criminals." The article advised Taiwan officials that "it is not yet too late" to turn back from the "wrong road" by returning to the mainland and working for Taiwan's liberation.

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## A P P E N D I X

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 7 - 13 APRIL 1975

Moscow (2827 items)

Upcoming V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(11%)	7%
Vietnam	(3%)	5%
China	(6%)	4%
Bandung Conference 20th Anniversary	(--)	4%
Yugoslav Premier Bijedic in USSR	(--)	3%
Brezhnev Meeting with Mongolian First Secretary Tsedenbal	(--)	3%
May Day Slogans	(--)	2%

Peking (856 items)

Indochina	(16%)	11%
[Cambodia	(7%)	5%]
[Vietnam	(7%)	4%]
Tung Pi-wu Death	(2%)	5%
Vice Premier Li	(1%)	5%
Hsien-nien in Iran		
USSR	(5%)	3%
Chiang Kai-shek Death	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.